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1. Introduction 
This paper seeks to contribute to an emerging body of literature that is concerned with the 
questions of transnational institution building (e.g. transnational spaces, communities, fields) and 
how such processes of transnationalization play together with national institutional frameworks 
and effect changes in business systems (e.g. Morgan, 2001; Djelic and Quack, 2003; Djelic and 
Sahlin-Andersson, 2006).  
 
Empirically our paper focuses on the private equity sector. The private equity sector was until 
recently confined to the Anglo-Saxon Business Systems. However, in recent years private equity 
firms have increasingly become a more international phenomenon both in terms of their country-
of-origin and country-of-destination of their investments. Therefore, this industry presents an 
interesting test case to investigate whether it is developing into a transnational community and 
moreover to what extent international private equity firms are transforming national business 
systems. In other words, we explore in this paper two questions: First, we ask whether the 
international private equity sector (IPES) can be regarded as an emerging transnational 
community (TC). Second, we ask, whether and in what way national business systems are 
transformed by the interaction with IPES.  
 
Regarding the first question, we examine whether private equity investors active in Germany and 
from different origins act in a similar way. Since Germany lacked until recently a private equity 
culture, the country suggests itself as a research context. Regarding the second question, we look 
at the impact of the IPES on German firms. In our view, the case of Germany is particularly 
interesting because the comparative capitalism literature has considered Germany a coordinated 
or cooperative market economy (Whitley, 1992; Hall and Soskice, 2001). In this type of 
economy, institutions promote long-term relations between the actors which are regarded as 
highly conducive to incremental innovations and diversified quality production (Streeck, 1991). 
More specifically, a constitutive element of this type of business system is seen in long-term 
relations between firms and their house banks. With the involvement of international private 
equity investors, this relationship maybe altered and replaced by a more short-term oriented 
Anglo-Saxon business model with possibly negative consequences on the innovative capacity on 
these firms. Thus, since long-terms credits or ‘patient capital’ are regarded as a key element for 
 3 
Germany’s comparative advantage in incremental innovations, the question arises, how private 
equity investors influence the German business system and particularly the strategies and 
organizational practices of companies focusing on diversified quality production. 
 
To address these questions conceptually, we draw on the following bodies of literature. First, 
drawing on Morgan (2001) and Scott (1994) we develop a definition of transnational 
communities (TCs). This definition serves as a basis to evaluate the extent to which the 
internationalizing private equity sector can be regarded as a genuine transnational community.  
Second, based on opposing positions on how processes of internationalization affect or interact 
with national contexts (Held et al., 1999; Morgan, 2001) we propose an open framework that 
considers three different outcomes for the constitution of business systems. These outcomes can 
vary between global convergence, unchanged divergence and new divergence or better novel 
configuration. We expect that firms embedded in transnational communities and national 
institutional frameworks face a situation of ‘institutional duality’ (Kostova and Roth, 2002). 
What kinds of outcomes such diverse institutional pressures produce with regard to the business 
system (re)constitution discussed is left to empirical exploration.  
 
The paper is structured as follows: In the following section, section two, we present a working 
definition of transnational communities as well as a framework to capture different outcomes of 
business system development resulting from their interaction with transnational communities. In 
addition, we conduct a literature review on the genesis and the business models of private equity 
investors to provide some background and understanding of the sector. We end section two with 
a review of recent findings on changes on the German business system and its institutional 
setting. Section three focuses on first empirical evidence. We first explore to which extent the 
international private equity sector can be regarded as an emerging TC. In a second step we 
investigate to what extent the international private equity industry is transforming key features of 
the German business system and its institutional context. Section four provides a summary and 
discussion of preliminary findings. Our paper is explorative in nature and draws on literature 
review and desk research. We would like to stress that the paper is but a first step to inform 
further research on the private equity sector in Germany, involving expert interviews and 
extensive case studies in firms at a later stage.  
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2. Conceptual Frameworks and Literature Review  
2.1 A Working Definition of Transnational Communities  
In the field of international business the concept of the ‘transnational corporation’ has been 
around for some time. While responsiveness to different national contexts still has its role to play 
in the ‘transnational solution’ (Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1998), it is the network-like character and 
the important role of socialisation as an integration mechanism that can be seen to create a 
distinct type of economic actor. In other words, it is an economic actor whose identity cannot be 
simply deduced from one particular national context.       
 
More recently, institutionalists and organization scholars – particularly the comparative 
institutionalists from Europe – have adopted the term ‘transnational communities’ from migration 
and ethnic studies (Morgan, 2001). Here too, the question is raised whether a transnational level – 
although interacting with other levels such as the national – constitutes a context of behaviour, 
identity and institutionalization in its own right.  While different processes of internationalization 
are identified for the emergence of transnational communities a central notion of the concept of 
transnational communities is that they are constituted by actors – be they individuals or 
organizations – that interact frequently and/or share cognitive frames of references that stretch 
beyond the nation state. 
 
To identify transnational communities in our study, we draw on Scott’s (1994) understanding of 
‘organizational fields’ and Morgan’s (2001) understanding of ‘transnational communities’. 
Scott’s sees an organizational field as mainly constituted by cultural and behavioural elements 
and defines it as “a community of organizations that partakes of a common meaning system 
whose participants interact more frequently and fatefully with one another than with actors 
outside the field” (Scott, 1994: 207-208). An important aspect of Scott’s (1994) field concept is 
for our research context that field borders are not geographically defined. In a similar vein, 
Morgan (2001) stresses the development of new shared understandings, meanings and identities 
that result from interactions between individuals or groups within a transnational space, seen as a 
“social space sui generis that cannot be reduced to the interplay of pre-existing national groups or 
interests” (115). Morgan (2001) defines transnational communities as consisting of “structured 
interactions between social actors located in more than one national setting” and sees these 
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interactions as not primarily based on contracts and markets but “on the recognition of a shared 
set of interests within a specific transnational social space, interests that are distinctive from 
nationally based interests” (Morgan, 2001: 117). Morgan specifies the nature and emergence of 
transnational communities as follows: 
[T]transnational communities do not have to consist of pre-existing ‘ethnic’ identities stretched across 
national boundaries. Instead they can be emergent, arising from prolonged structured interaction across 
national boundaries based, for example, on work and economic activity. These communities are not 
exclusive forms of social identity; social actors can participate in multiple transnational and national 
communities. Again, transnational communities cannot be understood as simple bottom-up responses to 
globalization; they have to be conceptualized in terms of the interplay between top-down projects of 
transnationalism, pursued by powerful actors, and bottom-up processes of mutual identification and 
collective awareness since it is through this interaction that transnational social space is created, distinctive 
from the national level. (Morgan, 2001: 118) 
 
Drawing on Morgan (2001) we see three developments in the internationalization of business 
activities that have the potential to create a social space for the emergence of a transnational 
community. The first concerns the internationalization of firms, the border-crossing activities of 
MNCs. The second development, involves the creation of regulatory frameworks to coordinate 
international economic activity. And the third is the development of shared cognitive and 
normative frameworks through common practices in business education, management 
consultancies and other global professional service firms. Morgan sees particularly in the last 
area the possible emergence of ‘ideological’ transnational communities.  
Similar, indicators for identifying emerging transnational communities or fields can be drawn 
from the new institutionalist work (DiMaggio and Powell, 1988; c.f. Geppert et al., 2006). In this 
perspective, we may seek to identify coercive, mimetic and normative pressures that stretch 
beyond the nation state thereby giving us a lead for the emergence of a transnational field or 
community. Specifically, we may identify: a field wide adoption of rules, regulations and 
business standards or practices that are stemming from the problem of legitimacy and political 
influence exerted by powerful actors on other actors; a field wide diffusion of best business 
models stemming from standard responses to uncertainty; and the creation of a common 
cognitive frameworks based on field wide professionalization processes and standards. 
2.3 Between Convergence and Divergence – Alternative concepts 
While the specific question, how transnational communities impact national institutional context 
is a relatively recent one, there has been for some time a growing body of literature dealing with 
the question how processes of internationalization, globalization or transnational institution 
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building impact or interact with national contexts. Drawing on Held et al. (1999) and Morgan 
(2001) three main camps can be identified in this literature. At the extreme poles are 
‘hyperglobalists’ and the ‘institutionalists’. While hyperglobalists argue in favour of global 
homogenization and convergence as a result of internationalization processes, the 
‘institutionalists’ take the opposite position, arguing in favour of continued or even deepening 
divergence as a result of internationalization. However, Held et al. (1999) and Morgan (2003) 
also identify a third position in the globalization debate in general and developing out of 
institutionalists and international business perspectives in particular. Labelled as 
‘transformationalism’, scholars in this group take a more differentiated view. They focus on 
interactions between different institutional levels and contexts and stress outcomes that go 
beyond simple convergence and divergence, alternately described as ‘hybrids’, ‘dialectical 
transformations’, ‘innovations or novel solutions’ (e.g. Boyer, 1998; Djelic, 1998; Becker-
Ritterspach, 2006a/b).  
Drawing on the positions discussed, we can imagine three scenarios and constitutive processes of 
business system change resulting from the IPES involvement. These outcomes comprise: 
increasing global convergence, unchanged divergence and new divergence or novel 
configurations. They potentially result from different ideal types of interaction between 
transnational communities and national institutional context in the constitution of business 
systems.  
 
Three scenarios 
In the first scenario, the scenario of global or transnational convergence, the national 
institutional context and the business system adapt to the conditions and demands of transnational 
community/field. In this scenario the institutional pressures of the IPES is extremely high, forcing 
an encompassing adaptation of the national institutional framework and the business system to 
their demands and conditions. Based on a fundamental changes of the national institutional 
context (resulting from dominance effects or multilateral rule making) as well as direct resource 
dependencies and isomorphic pressures exerted by the IPES, the business system and their firms 
yield to the demands and conditions of the transnational community or field. Depending on the 
degree to which they have developed into truly transnational communities, the convergent forms 
and practices will be more or less reflective of a specific country of origin (e.g. the Anglo-Saxon 
context). Specifically, here we would see the German business system to largely give in to the 
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demands and conditions of the IPES. As a result the firms researched would mainly reflect 
globally or transnationally converging organizational strategies, organizational forms and 
practices. In the second scenario, in the scenario unchanged divergence, transnational 
community/field adapts to the demands and conditions of the national institutional context and 
the business system. In this scenario strong and coherent national institutional context and 
business system are resilient. As a result the IPES has to strongly adapt to the conditions and 
demands of the host context, implying a high degree of continuation of existing patterns in the 
host institutional context and business system. Specifically, in this scenario the strength and 
coherence of the German institutional context would be so pronounced that the IPES is forced to 
adapt to the host institutional context, resulting in little change of the business system. In the 
third scenario, in the scenario of new divergence or novelty, the national institutional context and 
business system adapts to the transnational community/field as much as the transnational 
community/field adapts to the national institutional context. Such a mutual adaptation can also be 
understood as a ‘translation’ (c.f. Czarniawska and Joerges, 1996; Rottenburg, 1996) or a 
‘dialectical transformation’ (Becker-Ritterspach, 2006a). For the constitution of the firms in the 
German business system this implies newly emerging strategies, forms and practices that can be 
traced to the interaction between two distinct contexts. Such an outcome could be considered a 
new divergence or a novel configuration.  
 
Now, while much of earlier research has seen these outcomes as irreconcilable opposites we 
suggest that we need to take a more fine-grained perspective on business system transformation 
and the constitution of their firms within the context of transnationalization. In such a view it may 
even be possible that all these patterns of interaction and outcomes can coexist in the 
transformation of business systems and the (re-)constitution of their firms. In this view, it makes 
less sense to label the transformation of the business system only one way or another. Rather we 
suggest a closer look to identify in what respect of the business system or in what respect of the 
firms’ organizational forms and practices which kind of interaction caused what kind of 
constitutional outcome. As far as German firms impacted by the IPES involvement is concerned, 
this may mean that their organizational forms and practices reflect in some respects the 
traditional host business systems (unchanged divergence), in others – decoupled from the latter – 
the transnational field of the IPES (increasing convergence) and in yet others, completely novel 
solutions (novel divergence).  
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2.3 Private Equity: Clarification of Concept, Origin, and Business Model 
Prior to discussing the origins and business model of private equity, we need to clarify our 
understanding of this term. According to Leopold et al. (2003), private equity was in the 
beginning synonymous with the older term of venture capital, but has emerged in recent years as 
a more general term. The term private equity refers to equity investments in assets which are not 
freely tradable on public stock markets. The term includes later-stage investments, which 
comprise the takeover of established companies (“buy-outs”), expansion financing, and early-
stage investments in start-up companies with exceptional growth potential. The latter is venture 
capital in its classical sense (2003). In contrast, Bygraves & Timmons (1992) regard venture 
capital as the more general term under which buy-out financing can be subsumed. However, they 
make clear that sharp distinction exist between venture capital in the form of early-stage 
investments and buy-out investments. For the latter kind of investments they coin the rather 
derogatory term of “merchant capital” (1992: 31). Finally, in the understanding of Gompers & 
Lerner the term of venture capital is restricted to high-risk investments in early-stage companies 
(2001). To sum up, scholars of private equity/venture capital agree that significant differences 
exist between early-stage investments in start-up companies with exceptional growth potential on 
the one hand, and later-stage-investments, most notably buy-outs, in established companies on 
the other. Based on this distinction, our understanding of private equity is rather narrow and only 
includes buy-out and expansion financing. Moreover, as buy-out is the dominant form of later-
stage investments in Germany (Leopold et al., 2003), we focus exclusively on these. In the 
following, we outline the origins and business model of private equity – focussing on buy-outs – 
before we address in the next section the question of whether international private equity 
investors have become a transnational community. According to Leopold et al. (2003), buy-outs 
emerged as a new phenomenon in the US in the 1960s. While they were initially restricted to 
medium-sized companies, the focus shifted to the takeover of large corporations in the 1980s. 
Unfortunately, Leopold et al. (2003) do not go into further detail about the origins of buy-outs in 
the US. In Germany, buy-outs did not assume significant importance before 2000/2001 (Leopold 
et al., 2003).  
An excellent source of the origins and the business model of private equity with regard to buy-
outs is the contribution by Schäfer (2006). According to him, the first independent private equity 
company was Kohlberg, Kravis, Roberts & Co. (KKR), which was formed in 1976 in New York. 
However, their founders Jerome Kohlberg, Henry Kravis, and George Roberts had worked for 
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Bear Stearns before, where they did similar transactions. Therefore, it is difficult to determine the 
exact starting point of the private equity industry in the US. The first fund set up by KKR had a 
volume of 35 Mio. $., with banks and insurances as major investors. Their first transaction was 
the acquisition of the relatively small conglomerate A.J. Industries for 94 Mio. $ (Schäfer, 2006).  
This acquisition displayed a central feature of the private equity industry in general and buy-outs 
in particular: that is, takeovers are normally financed to a smaller percentage by equity and to a 
larger percentage by borrowings or debts; therefore being called a leveraged buy-out. This 
strategy makes large acquisitions possible without a heavy commitment of capital. The debts are 
imposed on the acquired company and its cash-flow is used to repay the debts. The term 
‘leveraged’ refers to the fact that the use of debts increases or leverages the financial return on the 
invested equity. Another purpose of high-debts is to put the management under high pressure. To 
align the interests of owners and management, the latter often receive a minority stake in the 
company. The holding period of an investment is commonly about 4-6 years, thus medium term. 
After that period, the exit is performed by a public offering, by a trade sale to another company, 
or by a sale to another private equity company (Schäfer, 2006).  
Two and a half years after the buy-out of A.J. Industries, KKR acquired the conglomerate 
Houdaille Industries for 380 Mio. $. In this case, the acquisition was 86% debt financed. In 
contrast to the first acquisition, the borrowed money involved a complex mixture of loans and 
high-yield bonds, also called junk bonds. These bonds have a higher risk of defaulting, but 
typically pay high yields to make them attractive for investors. Since investors were enthusiastic 
about junk bonds and their potential profits, private equity companies were able to raise huge 
amounts of capital and shifted their focus to large corporations. This proved to be quite 
profitable. In the 1970s and 1980s, many large conglomerates existed in the US, which were 
significantly undervalued. More specifically, the value of the conglomerate represented by its 
market capitalization was below the total value of its respective divisions. In addition, many 
conglomerates were managed in the best interest of the top managers – including luxurious perks 
such as many firm jets – rather than in the best interest of the shareholders (Schäfer, 2006: 18). 
Private equity investors ceased this opportunity, acquired a great number conglomerates through 
highly-leveraged buy-outs, reduced costs aggressively, and sold subsequently single parts of the 
conglomerate with a great profit. This trend epitomized in the leveraged buy-out of the 
conglomerate RJR Nabisco for a staggering amount of 31,3 billion $, described in detail in the 
bestseller “Barbarians at the Gate” by Burrough and Helyar (1990). However, this spectacular 
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buy-out proved to be unsuccessful and marked a turning point in the history of this industry. On 
the one hand, the ‘low-hanging crops” for investors – badly-managed conglomerates – were 
becoming scarce. On the other hand, not only was the reputation of the private equity industry 
damaged by the aggressive investment-style, but also the reputation of the banks and foundations 
that had invested in private equity funds. As a result, private equity companies were forced to 
change their original business model towards adding more value to the acquired companies. 
(Schäfer, 2006).  
Now, it remains to be seen to what extent their business model has not only changed but also 
become detached from its origins in the US business system. In the third section, this topic is 
examined more closely in the example of Germany. Clearly, the development of international 
private equity and venture capital industries and the crossing of borders by these firms is a major 
research gap since empirical studies have mainly focused on country comparisons (see also 
Wright et al. 2005). The few scholars that are contributing to this under researched field are 
divided over the question of an emergence of international private equity and venture capital 
industries. While Megginson (2004) sees a global market for private equity and venture capital 
emerging, Wright et al. (2005) remain sceptical and expect strong pressures on these investors to 
tailor their strategies and behaviour to local market conditions.  
2.4  The German Business System and Recent Institutional Changes 
Until recently, proponents of the comparative capitalism literature have described Germany’s 
market economy as a typical example of a ‘coordinated market economy’ (Hall & Soskice, 
2001), a ‘collaborative business system’ (Whitley, 2000), or a ‘continental European capitalism’ 
(Amable, 2003). In these institutions promote long-term relations and firms have a comparative 
advantage in mature industries characterized by incremental innovations as a result of 
cooperative management-workforce relations and long-term finance. For this production regime, 
Streeck (1991) also coined the term of the ‘diversified quality production’. In contrast to this 
cooperative model, the Anglo-Saxon model has been described as a ‘liberal market economy’, in 
which market institutions promote short-term relations, thereby creating a comparative 
institutional advantage for firms in new industries characterized by radical innovations due to 
their superior flexibility (Hall & Soskice, 2001).  
However, since the late 1990’s German capitalism has changed. A process of liberalization has 
set in, most notably in areas of the financial system and corporate governance. This included the 
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adoption of shareholder value principles by several of the large German corporations and the 
disentanglement of cross-shareholding networks. The latter was driven by the German banks, 
which reduced their shareholdings in large companies and shifted their strategic focus to the more 
profitable investment banking (Becker, 2001). The law of the red-green coalition government, 
which passed in 2002 and exempted sales of blocks of shares from tax payments, intensified this 
process (Höpner, 2004). Scholars in the field of comparative institutional analysis are now 
strongly divided over the question to what extent this liberalization has profoundly changed the 
character of the German business system and how it will evolve in the future. At present, three 
different interpretations are discernible, which assume either continuing institutional stability, the 
emergence of a new and stable hybrid institutional system combining cooperative and liberal 
elements, or a process of institutional convergence towards the market-based Anglo-Saxon 
model.  
Proponents of the first view, most notably Hall & Gingerich (2004), argue that despite a certain 
amount of liberalization the key principles of the coordinated German model are still intact.  
Without going into further detail about these institutional changes and their consequences, they 
regard the changes since the 1990s as rather superficial (Hall & Gingerich, 2004: 36).  
In contrast to this interpretation of a basically unchanged institutional stability, proponents of the 
second view, such as Deeg (2005), argue that there has been a profound institutional change in 
the financial and corporate governance system. As a result a hybrid business system has emerged, 
which now comprises a liberal order within a coordinated market context. Moreover, he discerns 
a bifurcation within the financial system. On the one hand, a small number of mostly large 
German companies and banks that have adopted the shareholder approach; and on the other hand, 
the large majority of German companies that have made hardly any efforts to adopt shareholder 
value principles. In this context Deeg also remains sceptical that the latter group will change 
much in the direction of shareholder value principles in the foreseeable future. Furthermore, he 
points out that an emphasis on the shareholder approach is not necessarily in conflict with the 
strong German codetermination. After all, improved corporate transparency is not only in the 
interest of investors but also in the interest of workers. In addition, he refers to Jackson (2003), 
who claims that large German firms have moved to an enlightened form of shareholder 
capitalism in which labour-management cooperation is retained. He also calls into question that 
long-term finance is of crucial importance for promoting diversified quality production. Instead 
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he argues that strong codetermination and collective bargaining may suffice to secure such a 
product market strategy (Deeg 2005).  
In contrast to the hybridization argument, Lane makes the claim that the German coordinated 
model will converge to the model of a liberal market economy (2005).  While in her view the 
German business system will not become identical to the US-American system, all institutional 
subsystems are being transformed and liberalized fundamentally. Lane (2005) strongly doubts 
that liberal and coordinated market orders can be integrated in one business system in the long 
run. In line with Hall & Soskice (2001), she assumes that such integration is constrained by 
requirements of system coherence. In contrast to Deeg (2005), she argues that the shareholder 
value approach reaches well beyond a minority of large corporations. Instead, the diffusion is 
seen to involve the majority of German firms based on widespread isomorphic pressures (Powell 
& Di Maggio 1991). Similar to Amable (2003), Lane (2005) regards the financial system as being 
on top of the institutional hierarchy. As it is tightly coupled with other societal subsystems, the 
market logic already established in the financial system will spread to other institutional 
subsystems, such as industrial relations, which have been up until now less affected by 
liberalization. Finally, she predicts that the regime of diversified quality production will not 
survive, as it will not be able to deliver to the high profit expectations of institutional investors 
and its institutional foundations will erode (Lane, 2005).  
Up to now, the recent phenomenon of private equity investors’ rushing to Germany has not 
attracted much attention of scholars of comparative institutional analysis. From our perspective, 
an analysis of the impact of private equity investors on the innovative capabilities on DQP firms 
– as a constitutive element of the German business system – and the institutional framework of 
Germany is a fascinating and ideal case to evaluate the competing positions of institutional 
hybridization and institutional convergence as represented by Deeg (2005), Lane (2005) and 
others in the global divergence-convergence debate (Held et al. 1999; Morgan, 2001). On the one 
hand, this trend represents the diffusion of the logics of financial investors beyond the DAX 30 
firms as predicted by Lane (2005) – although Lane has not taken private equity as a defusing 
force of shareholder principle into consideration. On the other hand, an ‘enlightened shareholder 
approach’ – essentially a more local or hybridized outcome – as mentioned by Deeg (2005) or 
Jackson (2003) can also not be ruled out.  
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3. First empirical indications 
3.1 International Private Equity Investors: An Emerging Transnational Community? 
In recent years, many private equity companies have become international and invested, among 
other countries, in Germany. This internationalization not only comprises investors from the US 
and Great Britain but also from many other countries such as: France (Axa Private Equity, 
Eurazeo), Sweden (EQT), Belgium (Group Bruxelles Lambert), Switzerland (Credit Suisse 
Private Equity), Dubai (Dubai International), Bahrein (Investcorp), and Germany (Allianz Private 
Equity, Odewald & Compagnie, Brockhaus Private Equity, and Arques). In this context, the 
question arises whether the internationalization signals a transnational community in the making.  
According to Morgan (2001), there are three developments in the internationalisation of business 
activities that have the potential to form into transnational communities: the development of 
multinational companies that are not only influenced by their country of origin; the development 
of international regulatory bodies; and the development of cognitive and normative frameworks, 
also called ‘ideological’ transnational communities. We argue that there are indications for the 
emergence of an ‘ideological’ transnational community of international private equity investors. 
This process is fuelled primarily by the cooperation between actors with different national 
backgrounds. Since we have not yet conducted interviews in private equity companies, we cannot 
answer the question to what extent they are truly becoming transnational communities. An 
international regulatory framework for private equity has not yet been established, even though 
there are increasing efforts in this direction. In March 2007, trade unions leaders of more than 20 
countries gathered in Paris in order to work out suggestions for an international private equity 
regime. However, this can only be regarded as a first attempt and the chances for success of this 
initiative remain unclear (Financial Times Deutschland, 16.3.2007). In the following, we focus on 
the mechanisms contributing to the emergence of an ‘ideological’ transnational community and 
highlight first signs of a shared identity.  
Broadly speaking, three types of interaction between private equity investors can be 
distinguished. First, there are competitive interactions in takeover bids; second, companies are 
traded between private equity companies; and third, there are cooperative interactions between 
private equity companies in the form of joint acquisitions. Companies are often taken over by 
more than one private equity house as they seek to diversify their risks. In this way, actors in the 
industry interact and get to know each other. Furthermore, we assume that particularly the third 
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type of interaction has the potential to transform international private equity investors into a 
transnational community. For example, focussing on German private equity houses such as 
Allianz Capital Partners and Odewald & Compagnie, two of the larger German private equity 
investors, several joint transactions with US-American and British investors have taken place. In 
1998, Allianz Capital Partners, the British private equity company APAX, and Lufthansa jointly 
acquired Tank & Rast – a company operating a network of filling stations, restaurants, hotels and 
service stations at German motorways – and sold the company to Terra Firma, another UK 
private equity investor, in 2004. Allianz Capital Partners and Goldman Sachs acquired in 2000 
the Messer Griesheim GmbH – a company specialized on industrial gases and formerly owned by 
the French-German pharmaceutical corporation Aventis – and sold the company to the world 
leader in industrial gases, Air Liquide in 2004 (see homepage www.allianzcapitalpartbners.com). 
In 2003, the German investment company Odewald & Compagnie and the American investment 
company Bain Capital acquired the German coating manufacturer Süddekor GmbH, and sold it in 
2007 to the German investor Quadriga Capital (see homepage www.ocie.de). Besides, there are 
not only joint acquisitions but also private equity funds that are jointly set up by German and 
Anglo-Saxon investors. Such an example is the media corporation Bertelsmann, which was 
considered until recently a very traditional and conservative German company. Bertelsmann 
teamed up with the US-American investors Citigroup Private Equity and Morgan Stanley 
Principal Investments to set up a private equity fund (Financial Times Deutschland, 22.3.2007). 
While we do not know specifics about any of these interactions between German and Anglo-
Saxon investors, there is little doubt that joint acquisitions and funds of German and Anglo-
Saxon private equity investors require some shared understanding of how to conduct business. 
Clearly, these interactions are contributing to the emergence of a transnational space. An open 
question is, however, if German investors are generally adapting to the investment strategies of 
Anglo-Saxon private equity houses or if there is a mutual adaptation going on.  
Another pointer for the emergence of shared identities are common myths and heroes in the 
industry. This has become particularly evident in an interview with Dominique Seneqiuer, the 
chief executive of Axa Private Equity, the largest private equity company in France (Schäfer 
2006). The interview revolved around the public criticism of private equity and hedge funds in 
Germany and France and Michael Milken. The latter popularised junk bonds in the 1980, which 
facilitated leveraged buy-outs up to 31,3 billion $, as happened in the case of RJR Nabisco (see 
above). In 1986, Milken was accused of financial fraud and sentenced to ten years in prison by a 
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US-court. According to Dominique Senequier, this conviction was purely politically motivated. 
She blames the establishment of the US economy in the 1980s for his conviction because they 
rejected the introduction of shareholder principles.  
The establishment of the economy of the US did not like the interferences of Milken. They dumped him. 
The same is happening now in France and Germany, where the establishment of executives and the 
supervisory boards rail against hedge funds, because they fear for their advantages. In contrast to Milken, 
they will not succeed in destroying them, since there are 8000 hedge funds worldwide (our translation, cited 
in Schäfer 2006: 37) 
 
Even though this comment is on hedge funds, Milken’s ‘invention’ of junk bonds as a tool used 
in leveraged buy outs was particularly important for the private equity industry (see above). In 
this citation, Milken is portrayed as a hero of the financial community propagating shareholder 
principles. The establishment of the US economy in the 1980s is portrayed as the villain in this 
tale. They feared for their perks and send an innocent man to jail. In our perspective, this 
comment indicates at least some degree shared identity in the financial community, which 
transcends national boundaries and is not necessarily identical with the interests and ideas of the 
US business system.  
In summary, since manifold relations and interactions exist between private equity investors of 
different origins – be it in the form of joint transactions or other modes – we assume that a 
transnational ‘ideological’ community with a shared identity is in the making. In addition, we 
expect that a similar educational backgrounds, such as the acquirement of an MBA (master of 
business administration) or work experience in an investment bank, is also contributing to the 
emergence of a transnational ‘ideological’ community. However, we have not analysed the 
educational background of German private equity investors yet.  
3.2 The International Private Equity Sector in Germany  
3.2.1 Scale and Scope of the IPES in Germany: Between Locust and Fertilizer   
The involvement of the IPES in Germany has been anything but a silent development. In the 
recent past Germany has seen a heated debate about the economic effects of the IPES 
involvement. The Social Democrats and the IG Metall (the union that represents workers in 
industries such as steel and autos) have coined the term ‘locust’ to describe the IPES activity. 
Much of the public debate and media coverage has highlighted the negative economic effects of 
the IPES involvement in Germany (e.g. Rügemer, 2005). The principle concern has been the 
potentially disastrous effects on firm survival and employment in Germany. This picture stands in 
 16 
marked contrast to liberal sections of the business press; the IPESs own accounts; as well as 
studies commissioned by private equity associations, such as the BVK (German Private Equity 
and Venture Capital Association). These studies are stressing the importance of venture capital 
and private equity for the German economy (Suhl and Weber, 2005). Private equity is seen to 
have gone where no other investors dared to and helped German companies to restructure by 
developing a market for non-core holdings (Business Week, 16/5/2005). Moreover, its crucial 
role in providing alternative sources of finance for medium-size firms is emphasised in the face 
of more restrictive and risk avers lending practices by house banks following the Basle II accord 
(Frommann and Dahmann, 2005). As there is little independent evaluation of the scale, scope and 
overall effects of the IPES activity on the German business system and its constituting firms we 
have to rely in a first step on publicly available information from different sections of the press 
and associations.   
 
The IPES’s involvement in the German economy emerged in the late 1990s. Between 2001 and 
2004 the value of private equity deals quadrupled. While in 2001 the volume of deals was at 6.78 
billion dollars, they were already at 27.7 in 2004 (Business Week, 16/5/2005). According to 
BVK, BVK members are presently holding a portfolio of about 21.6 billion Euros and are 
involved in almost 6000 firms. Seen as a homogeneous group the venture capital and private 
equity financed companies are said to employ around 640000 people and generate a turnover of 
around 114 billion Euros, which amounts to 5.1% of Germany’s GDP (Suhl and Weber, 2005). 
Against this background, Euroweek interprets the importance of private equity and venture 
capital firms in Germany as follows: 
To put those figures into context, they mean that – indirectly – private equity ranks as the second largest 
employer in Germany behind the public sector, according to E&Y. It also has a greater economic 
importance than agriculture, ship-building, mining and steel put together, according to E&Y. (Euroweek, 
11/11/2005) 
 
Since 2001 investments in the venture capital and private equity sector in Germany are 
dominated by leveraged buy-outs. In 2006, 56,1% of the total investments in the sector where 
leveraged buy-outs1. Regarding the scope of private equity activity, the BVK reports a continued 
                                                 
1
 http://www.bvk-ev.de/media/file/110.BVK_Jahresstatistik_2006_200207.pdf 
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rise in small and medium-size investments2. Analysts point out that in the past – apart form a few 
prominent cases – most investments involved conglomerate spin-offs, rather than traditional, 
organically grown small- and medium-size firms (Euroweek, 11/11/2005). However, while the 
scope of firms that see IPES involvement cannot be fully assessed at this point, it seems clear that 
only a limited number of medium-size firms are actually interesting for the IPES (Creditreform 
Wirtschafts und Konjunkturforschung, 2005). According to the German MittelstandsMonitor 
(24/3/2005) investments need to have a financial volume of at least 5 million Euros, otherwise 
the IPES find an engagement not interesting due to high fixed costs for due diligence and 
company evaluations. Moreover, firms singled out for investments tend to have a value of more 
than 100 million Euro, are already profitable and have the potential of becoming market leaders, 
so-called ‘Hidden Champions’, in an industry or market niche (Rügemer, 2005; Frommann and 
Dahmann, 2005). As only a limited group of medium-size firms is able to attract IPES 
investments, it is doubtful whether private equity can be seen as a finance alternative for the 
small- and medium-size companies as a whole. This finding could be rated as a first indication 
that only a limited number of firms in the German business system are directly impacted by the 
IPES.     
 
3.2.2 IPES pushing for changes in the German institutional framework and business system 
After we have discussed first indications for the scale and scope of IPES involvement in the 
German business system we investigate how the IPES impact the firms that constitute the 
German business systems. In principle the IPES can have a direct and indirect effect on the 
German business system. It can indirectly – together with other pressures – change the German 
business system and its constituting firms by pushing for changes in the German institutional 
framework. At the same time, the impact can be more direct by investing in firms of the business 
system, thereby not only replacing part of the former institutional embeddedness but also pushing 
for internal strategic and organizational changes. In the following section we will briefly discuss 
first general evidence about such influences, before we then turn our attention to a mini case 
study.   
                                                 
2http://www.bvk-
ev.de/bvk.php/cat/75/aid/255/title/BVK+Statistics+on+3rd+Quarter+2006++%96+German+private+equity+and+ven
ture+capital+firms+again+increased+their+investments 
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The German institutional context, especially the financial system has undergone substantial 
changes in the last decade. These changes are strongly related to transnational institution building 
and rule making at the political and economic levels. At the political level, changes in national 
legislations and harmonization of national legislation in Europe have changed the institutional 
context and opened the way for private equity involvement in Germany. At the European level, 
treaties have been signed regulating the free flow of capital. In this context the Economist states:   
Germany has signed up to EU treaties that prescribe the free flow of capital across national borders. 
Repudiating these is impossible without leaving the EU. The same applies to taxing foreign-exchange 
transactions or introducing a minimum holding period for an equity investment – both recent suggestions. 
Hedge funds and private-equity funds have open access for the long or short term. (Economist, 7/5/2005) 
 
Another important change in the German institutional context has been triggered by a tax reform 
in Germany, in 2000. The reform has made profits from firm sales tax-free and created thereby an 
incentive for the disentanglement of cross-holdings. Ironically, this reform, which has been 
introduced by the Social Democrats, has also paved the way for the IPES involvement in 
Germany.  
The second complex of regulatory changes is commonly captured by the catchword Basel II. In 
simple terms the introduction of Basel II has led to more restrictive and risk avers lending 
practices by the house banks, the traditional capital sources of small- and –medium size firms in 
Germany. This accord has created an increasing need and entry point for alternative sources of 
financing such as the IPES investments.   
While the institutional context for firms in the German business system has changed, it would be 
wrong to suggest that such changes have been driven by a single economic actor such as the 
IPES. This is not to deny that the private equity sector is lobbing for changes in the Germany’s 
institutional regime. For example, the BVK has formulated a long list of demands for 
deregulation and changes in legislation for private equity groups and fund raising in Germany 
(Fromman and Dahmann, 2005). While the Government has followed some of these demands or 
recommendations through new legislation, other demands remain unfulfilled.  
 
Changes in the nature of firms   
Clearly, the changes in the financial system in Germany – as a crucial part of the institutional set 
up – and the introduction of new actors and sources of finance has the potential to change: the 
nature of firms; the nature of market relations between firms; and the nature of coordination and 
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control systems between firms; in short, the business system. Now, what is the evidence for direct 
changes in the nature of firms and their relations as a result of the IPES involvement? A cursory 
review of press publications suggests that IPES triggers across the board a much stronger profit 
orientation in the firms involved. The economist notes, for example:   
Such investors tend to focus on generating strong cashflow, and controlling capital expenditure strictly, so 
that the debt can be serviced. The firm's managers and workers, and their objectives, are constantly under 
review. Although new for many German firms, with their long lunch-breaks, rest cures and limited working 
hours, such changes are surely long overdue. (Economist 28/5/2005) 
 
It is true that foreign private-equity funds have been the most active players in restructuring corporate 
Germany in the past two years. Their methods are often unsentimental, to say the least. Costs and staff can 
be slashed, equity is quickly turned into high-yield debt, and a positive return is sought sooner rather than 
later. The effect on a company's culture can be traumatic. Life in the boardroom and on the shop floor (for 
those who still have a job) is never the same again. Performance targets and personal assessments can 
radically change the atmosphere. (Economist, 7/5/2005) 
 
While these are more general assessments, it may be warranted to take a close a look at 
individual cases. We have chosen for a brief analysis the company Grohe. This company suggest 
itself because it has received a lot of media attention and can be seen as a typical representative 
of diversified quality production.  
 
The Grohe Case 
Grohe is a market leader in the design and production of premium bath faucets and showers, 
kitchen mixers, thermostats. In June 2005 the company had 5870 employees out of which 4300 
where Germany based. In 1999 Grohe was bought by the private equity group BC Partners for 
900 million Euros. In 2004 BC partners sold Grohe to the Texas Pacific Group (TPG) and the 
Credit Suisse First Boston Private Equity (CSFB) group. While the actual purchase price is 
unclear and varies between 1.5 billion and 1.8 billion Euro, it is suggested that a sale to a 
strategic buyer or via the stock exchange would have been less attractive. In contrast to BC 
Partners return on investment expectations of about 5 years, the new owners envisioned a return 
on invested equity within 18 months (Kamp and Krieger, 2005).  
 
In the process of this acquisition, Grohe was removed from stock exchange. Among the major 
goals of the first owners was a strategic reorientation of the company focussing on the company’s 
internationalisation. This reorientation was largely successful and shifted foreign sales from 64.3 
% in 1999 to above 80% more recently (Kamp and Krieger, 2005). With the new owners Texas 
Pacific Group (TPG) and the Credit Suisse First Boston Private Equity (CSFB) in the driver’s 
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seat further reorganizations where initiated. Among other things the board of directors was 
replaced. With the help of McKinsey the reorganisation program ‘Fit for the Future’ was 
introduced. The tough program aimed at reducing cost by 2007 annual savings of around 150 
million Euros. Major corner stones of the program involved: a reduction of suppliers from 6000 
to a maximum of 1500; a substantial reduction of product variety from 18000 to 12000; shifting 
major parts of production abroad; reduction of sites and employment in Germany; as well as 
investments into the remaining sites (Kamp and Krieger, 2005). However, it is also noteworthy 
that the original reorganization plan as proposed by McKinsey involving a comprehensive shift of 
production to China and the slashing of 3000 has not materialized. Instead only one site in 
Germany was closed down and 943 jobs were lost. While it is not clear what enabled this milder 
route of reorganization, there are indications that the works council played a constructive role. 
Kamp and Krieger (2005) report that the works council commissioned a counter report, prepared 
by a Dutch consulting firm, which played a role in the negotiation between the management and 
works council. In a similar vein, the Financial Times Deutschland (6/3/2007) reports that the 
works council has by and large approved of the reorganization measures and sees on the balance 
sheet more capital investment than drain.  
 
However, while the reorganization contributed to record sales and profits at Grohe, the financial 
situation of the firm deteriorated. Among other factors (exchange rates, raw material prices), this 
deterioration can be attributed to heavy debt that resulted from the replacement of internal with 
outside capital. Kamp and Krieger (2005) argue that Grohe had to finance its own take over two 
times. Despite rising turnover and profits the Financial Times Deutschland (6/3/2007) rates the 
financial risks for the company high as debt has remained high in the face of strong investments.  
 
What can this mini case tell us about changes in the nature of this firm, its relations and above all 
innovation capacity? Clearly, the case shows that patient capital has been increasingly replaced 
with more short term oriented ‘impatient capital’. This change signals a fundamental shift in the 
nature of the firm. However, also the company’s market relations are changing. On the one hand, 
these become more international by a focus on foreign sales. On the other, hand domestic 
relations are changed by substantially reducing the supplier base. It remains an open question if 
and how this changes the nature of coordination and control between Grohe and its suppliers. 
While there are not many pointers with regard to the firm’s innovative capacity, the capital’s 
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impatience, the reduction of product variety and the outsourcing of production could have 
adverse affects the company’s capacity for incremental innovation. It also has to be noted, 
however, that the investors proved more patient than initially expected and the German industrial 
relation system – specifically the works councils – may have a moderating effect on radical 
investor strategies.    
 
3.2.3 The impact of the German institutional context and business system on IPES   
In this final empirical part, we briefly investigate what aspects of German institutional context 
and business system are possibly modifying the behaviour of the IPES. On the one hand, the 
German institutional context may limit certain IPES approaches through legal restrictions and 
other system constraints. At the same time, there can be a more direct influence on IPES 
strategies based on local firm responses to IPES involvement. So far little systematic evidence 
has been gathered on the impact of German institutional context and business system on IPES 
behaviour. Nevertheless, there are some indications about potential constraining effects of the 
political, legal and cultural environment in Germany.  
Clearly, the public attention and political debate had its impact on the IPES active in Germany. 
The political debate has triggered demands and political initiatives for new regulations for IPES 
activities. A case in point is a Governmental working group that has made suggestion for tighter 
controls and regulation of Hedge-Funds (Kamp und Krieger, 2005). At the same time, the 
political debate has created reluctance among the German firms to sell their companies to private 
equity investors. Such reluctance is suggested by an article in Euroweek:  
Others think that Müntefering's comments were sufficiently influential to change some market practitioners' 
plans. "We know of at least two or three transactions in which either the private equity sponsor withdrew or 
the vendor decided that it no longer wanted to sell out to private equity as a reaction to the Müntefering 
outburst," says John Jetter, managing director of JP Morgan's Frankfurt office. (Euroweek, 11/11/2005) 
 
One area of the leveraged loans space that has failed to live up to the expectations of some lenders has been 
the market for facilities supporting change of ownership among Mittelstand companies. "In 1997 and 1998 a 
lot of sponsors drew up business plans for Germany based on the expectation that there would be a doubling 
of deals driven by Mittelstand companies," says Day at Commerzbank. "I remember advising the sponsors 
then that they were over-estimating the potential for Mittelstand-driven transactions." Others agree, saying 
that there is still a reluctance among many Mittelstand companies to sell out to private equity investors. 
"You still meet Mittelstand company owners who know the number of employees on their payroll but not 
their latest profit figures," says one. (Euroweek 11/11/2005) 
 
Apart from the public and political debate, there are legal constraints for IPES (e.g. Economist, 
5/7/2005). Riehmer and Wand (2006) argue that German corporate law is often seen as a 
constraint to an acquisition of a German DAX or MDAX company by private equity investors 
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(Riehmer and Wand, 2006). Clearly, a closer look into the legal conditions and changes – at the 
national and European level – affecting the IPES will be required to gain a deeper understanding 
about institutional constraints for their activities and strategies.  
Next to political and legal constraints, cultural conditions are also mentioned as barriers to the 
IPES involvement. Thakur-Weigold, head of alternative investments at HSBC, is quoted as 
saying: "The idea is to incentive management and then sell to another company, but it doesn't 
work well in Germany. In countries like the UK and to a lesser extent France, management 
dreams about owning the company for themselves but this is not true in Germany. They are quite 
happy being part of a big group and even feel slighted if you tell them you will sell them if they 
do a good job" and continues: "Germany is all about private equity, in that private ownership is 
still the norm. If you take a list of the 30 biggest listed companies in Germany and a list of the 
30-biggest companies then there is only limited overlap. There is a long tradition of buying 
companies here, but none of selling them again. Selling has been seen as a sign of weakness". 
(Euromoney, March, 2005).  
4. Conclusion 
This paper centres on two questions. First, does the internationalization of private equity – 
examined in the example of Germany – lead to the emergence of a transnational ‘ideological’ 
community? Second, to what extent do international private equity investors change the business 
system of Germany; can we discern unchanged divergence, convergence to the Anglo-Saxon 
business system, or a novel hybrid business system somewhere between a coordinated and a 
liberal market economy? Even though our findings are very preliminary and extensive case 
studies and interviews are yet to come, some conclusion can be drawn. 
Regarding the first question, there are indications for the emergence of a transnational 
‘ideological’ community. International private equity investors, which are also active in 
Germany, interact with each other in manifold ways. They compete against each other in 
takeover bids, they trade acquired companies among themselves, and they cooperate in takeovers 
so as to diversify their risks. In our view, the latter type of interaction has the greatest potential to 
contribute to an emergence of a transnational community. When German and Anglo-Saxon 
private equity investors jointly and repeatedly take over companies, we can assume a shared 
understanding of how to conduct business. What we do not know yet, however, is whether this 
shared understanding is exclusively based on American business principles or is also influenced 
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by the original German business principals, such as the importance of long-term relations. The 
fact that not only public opinion but also many managers and owners of companies are very 
sceptical of private equity, could lead to a business model, which also includes non-US elements.  
Regarding the second question, some change of the German business system is clearly 
identifiable. To begin with, the involvement of private equity investors in the German economy 
increased rapidly in recent years. Between 2001 and 2004, the value of private equity deals in 
Germany quadrupled from 6.78 billion $ to 27.7. The case of Grohe also shows that the takeover 
of a company by private equity investors does not only include a change of ownership but also 
far-ranging reorganizations, such as the relocation of production and the termination of many 
long-standing supplier relations. In addition, private equity investors in Germany are pushing for 
institutional change in the form of an investor-friendly regulatory environment, although with 
mixed success. Thus, the scenario of unchanged divergence between the German and the Anglo-
Saxon business model seems unlikely. On the other hand, there are also forces working against a 
growing importance of private equity investors in the German economy. First of all, private 
equity is still a limited phenomenon in the German economy, since investments are restricted to 
larger companies and are rather rare in the German Mittelstand. Furthermore, many managers of 
large German corporations are very sceptical on private equity. If their negative stance towards 
private equity will eventually dwindle is far from clear. Therefore, we expect the emergence of a 
new hybrid business system rather than a convergence to the US business system.  
 
Based on these preliminary findings, we suggest that understanding the changes in the German 
Business system as a result of IPES involvement can be informed by different perspectives on 
globalisation. Particularly enriching we see concepts that consider the embeddedness of firms in 
different institutional contexts. We assume that demands from different institutional context will 
give rise to novel or hybrid organizational forms (Westney, 1993; Boyer, 1998; Djelic and 
Quack, 2003, Becker-Ritterspach, 2006a/b). In theory terms, our work seeks to contribute to 
understanding how processes of transnationalization play together with national institutional 
frameworks. With regard to the question how business systems are impacted by processes of 
transnationalization we see further development of concepts of institutional duality as particularly 
promising. In such a perspective certain firms or segments of the business system are 
simultaneously embedded in transnational communities or fields and national institutional 
contexts. While seeing processes of transnationalization leading to institutional duality and a 
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more complex contextual constitution of firms is not a new insight, a possible combination of the 
explanatory powers of different institutional perspectives may well be (Tempel and Walgenbach, 
2006; Geppert et al., 2006). Moreover, suggesting such a new perspective on the institutional 
embeddedness of firms could serve to overcome simple convergence divergence dichotomies 
(authors like Ohmae, 1990 on the one hand and Hu, 1992 or Whitley, 1998 on the other). Such a 
perspective could also help us to redraw the lines of business systems, i.e. business systems that 
are still institutionally embedded but not solely in one context and not necessarily national on all 
counts. While some dimensions of organizational forms and practises of firms, or some firms as a 
whole, may be increasingly embedded in transitional communities or fields, others may remain 
more firmly embedded in national institutional contexts, and yet others may be stuck right in-
between. In our preliminary findings there is some indication for such a segmentation of the 
business system.  
 
Once again, this paper is only the first step in a research project and presents very preliminary 
results. The next steps will include the survey of quantitative data so as to evaluate the 
importance of private equity in the German economy and the conduction of interviews in private 
equity companies and companies acquired by them. In addition, we seek to develop indicators in 
order to measure the innovative capabilities of companies taken over by private equity. Besides, 
we also consider the role of hedge funds in the change of the German business system an 
interesting field of study, as became evident in the case of the Deutsche Börse AG.  
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